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Copyright and Social Media:
A Tale of Legislative Abdication
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman*
Social media platforms, their users and commercial
content providers are like the Hatfields and the McCoys: it is
war out there, and new arenas of combat keep popping up with
all the vigor of noxious weeds in the vegetable garden. Just
looking at copyright (trademarks are another subject of
dispute, one this brief paper will not address), we see social
media sites laying expansive claim to the copyrights of their
through force or
users;1 the content industry trying,
persuasion, to shift onto social media platforms (and Internet
service providers (ISPs) generally) significant, indeed primary,
responsibility for copyright enforcement; and commercial
players, who have come to see social networks as valuable
platforms for their own content, eying citizen participants not
only as potential copyright thieves, but as competitors for

*

Samuel Tilden Professor of Law Emerita, New York University School of
Law.
1. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2013),
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (Similarly, the terms of service for
Facebook provide that “[f]or content that is covered by intellectual property
rights, like photos and videos (IP content), you specifically give us the
following permission, subject to your privacy and application settings: you
grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide
license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook
(IP License). This IP License ends when you delete your IP content or your
account unless your content has been shared with others, and they have not
deleted it.”); Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE (May 15,
2014), https://myspace.com/pages/terms (Myspace’s terms of service states the
following: “You grant us broad rights to use and exploit Content you post or
make available via the Myspace Services, your profile and activity
information, and your name, persona and likeness, as more fully explained
below. You will not be entitled to compensation or attribution even if we or
others profit from such use. However, you remain the owner and fully
responsible for your Content and for ensuring that its use in connection with
the Myspace Services do not violate any third party rights or any law. Your
right to use Myspace Content, User Content and Third Party Content is very
limited and revocable.”).
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valuable viewer eyeballs. You will not be surprised to learn
that the fiercest fights are duked out on behalf of big content
providers in legislatures, courts and during trade negotiations.
For that reason, the focus of this article will be on what I
call DMCA 2.0. It will begin by discussing the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)2 and why that statute,
passed in 1998 to shore up the enforceability of copyright
online by protecting content providers’ ability to engage in
forms of technological self-help against online copyright
infringers, has been problematic. Part II describes largely
unsuccessful efforts in the form of statutes and trade
agreements to shore up the DMCA. Part III turns to the latest
salvo, the adoption of “voluntary agreements” whereby content
owners and ISPs, in particular social media platforms, join
forces to stem infringement. The final section lays out the
difficulties with the voluntary solution and suggests that
legislators have abdicated their responsibility to maintain a
fair balance between rights of social network users and
commercial content providers.
I.

The DMCA

Copyright has traditionally depended largely on voluntary
compliance and civil litigation to maintain relative stability
between owners and users. This system worked well in the era
of hard copy, where infringement tended to require
considerable and expensive infrastructure and where the end
product had somehow to be brought, fairly transparently, into
the marketplace. Once personal copying technologies such as
photocopiers and videocassette recorders became widely
available, infringement was harder to detect and pursue. The
advent of the Internet was perceived by the copyright
industries as having put the problem of infringement beyond
the capacity of existing copyright law to control. The industries
decided that they themselves needed to use technology
proactively to limit access to protected works in electronic form
and to control the ability of users with a computer to copy and
2. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512, §§ 1201-1204
(2012).
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distribute the works at will.3 By making it illegal for users to
hack around access controls,4 or to make and market
technologies that would enable the public to defeat methods
used by owners to protect their content,5 the DCMA was
intended to make it possible for owners to prevent
infringement without the continual intervention of the courts.
Although the United States is still trying to convince its
trading partners to introduce their own versions of the DMCA
into their legal systems,6 on the home front, wide agreement
exists that the legislation has been less than successful. First
of all, digital rights management technologies have been
unpopular with the public7 and sometimes quite problematic in
their consequences.8 They are also like caviar to hackers.9
A further source of difficulty from the perspective of the
content industries resides in the fact that, as a part of the same
legislation, Congress created a number of so-called “safe
harbor” provisions to protect ISPs against damages arising
from content transmitted or posted on websites by other
3. The self-help strategy is discussed in Diane L. Zimmerman, Living
Without Copyright in a Digital World, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1375, 1378-81 (2007).
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (these technologies are commonly known as
digital rights management tools or DRMs).
6. See Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Aug. 30, 2013,
available at
http://wikileaks.org/tpp/ [hereinafter TPP] (exploring the
controversy over the IP provisions in the TPP, a secretly negotiated trade
pact, the contents of which we learned thanks to Wikileaks).
7. See Macworld Staff, iTunes Store and DRM-Free Music: What You
Need
to
Know,
MACWORLD
(May
15,
2014),
http://www.macworld.com/article/1138000/drm_faq.html
(a
major
breakthrough occurred when all the major record labels agreed to allow songs
to be sold without DRMs).
8. See Bob Brown, Sony BMG Rootkit Scandal: 5 Years Later,
NETWORKWORLD
(Nov.
2,
2010),
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/110110-sonybmg-rootkit-fsecuredrm.html (a DRM used by Sony to protect its music against copying opened a
window in purchaser’s computers that allowed malware to infiltrate them. It
caused a major scandal).
9. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,
303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub. nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (see the lower court’s decision for the facts). (One
of the first challenges to the DMCA, the case involved a hack to the DRM
used to restrict access to digital video recordings. The defendants in the case
argued that they needed to get around the DRM to enable them to watch
movies on computers using Linux operating systems.)
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parties.10 The terms for eligibility vary with the kind of ISP,
but all must have a publicly stated policy that allows them to
terminate account holders and subscribers for repeated
instances of illicit content – or as I like to think of it, copyright
recidivism.11 All ISPs must also agree to “accommodate”
something called standard technology measures (ones that
allow copyright owners “to identify or protect” their intellectual
property).12
ISPs that do not host content, but merely transmit it,
receive the broadest protection.13 Because peer-to-peer file
sharing occurs on these networks, the burden of tracking down
participants, identifying them, and suing them has fallen
almost entirely on the content owners. Pursuing remedies has
proven expensive and has also resulted in truly dreadful public
relations. Law suits against individuals – who are likely to be
the industry’s customer base as well – have not won friends for
large content owners.14
10. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998). (The purpose was to avoid
underinvestment in Internet infrastructure by removing the spectre of
secondary liability for ISPs based on the activities of their users).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
12. Id. § 512(i)(1)(B).
13. Id. § 512(j) (they have to find the infringer, get a subpoena to require
the ISP to identify him or her, prove that infringement has occurred, and only
then might a court enjoin the ISP from providing service to the individual or
entity under).
14. This of course does not mean owners will not sue consumers.
Makers of the award-winning film, The Hurt Locker, sued more than 24,500
individuals in 2011 for downloading the movie. See Sarah Jacobsson
Purewal, ‘Hurt Locker’ Lawsuit Targets 24,583 BitTorrent Users, PC WORLD
(May
24,
2011,
8:07
AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/228519/Hurt_Locker_Lawsuit_Targets_24583
_BitTorrent_Users.html. The action was terminated after an unknown
number of settlements, only to have the plaintiffs file suit in Florida against
2,512 more people. See Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, ‘Hurt Locker’ Studio Sues
2,514 Over Copyright Infringement, PC WORLD (Apr. 24, 2012, 7:41 AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/254381/hurt_locker_sue_2_514_over_copyrigh
t_infringement.html. More recently, the makers have sued individuals who
allegedly downloaded the film Dallas Buyers Club. See Ernesto Van Der Sar,
Dallas Buyers Club Sues BitTorrent Pirates Citing Oscar Wins,
TORRENTFREAK (Mar. 12, 2014), https://torrentfreak.com/dallas-buyers-clubsues-bittorrent-pirates-citing-oscar-wins-140312/. ISPs that make peer-topeer file sharing possible have agreed to participate in something called the
Copyright Alert program. See What is a Copyright Alert?, CTR. FOR
COPYRIGHT INFO., http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-
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For those ISPs that host user content – and that includes
social media sites – and for search engines, the system works
somewhat differently. Such ISPs, upon receipt of a proper
notice from the content owners of a specific instance of
infringing content posted on the site, must act promptly to take
it down.15 The notice and takedown process has turned out to
be expensive for both sides: just to give one example, Google
receives, and must act on, in excess of 6 million take-down
notices a week.16 Also, material taken down in one place
frequently pops up in another, creating what is generally
referred to as the “Whack-a-Mole” problem – a need to send
notices over and over about the same content.17
Absent a properly drafted takedown notice, ISPs subject to
that scheme pretty much have to be hit over the head with
evidence that a user has posted a specific infringing work for
the ISP to have any independent duty to take down infringing
content. The statute does contain what is called a “red flag”
provision that says the ISP must act on its own if it has actual
knowledge of the presence of infringing content, or is aware of
“facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent.”18 Plaintiffs, including most notably Viacom, spent
years trying to convince courts to adopt theories that would
deprive ISPs of their statutory immunity, including the
argument that an ISP with general awareness of the presence
(indeed prevalence) of infringing content on its site has met the
“red flag” test and must proactively remove it. The push by
Viacom finally faltered, and its suit against YouTube settled,
system/what-is-a-copyright-alert/http://www.copyrightinformation.org/thecopyright-alert-system/what-is-a-copyright-alert/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
For more information about Copyright Alert, see infra notes 45-47 and
accompanying text.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3) (search engines are required to disable access
to infringing content upon receipt of notice).
16. Since 2011, Google has received almost 24 million takedown
requests.
Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE (Mar. 25, 2014),
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright.
17. See
Whac-a-Mole,
WIKIPEDIA
(Jan
8,
2015),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whac-a-Mole. Whac-a-mole is a popular game.
But in colloquial use, the term Whack-a-Mole refers to “a repetitious and
futile task . . . . [I]n computing and networking . . . , it refers to the process of
fending off recurring spammers, vandals or miscreants.” Id.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
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after the district court granted summary judgment to the
defendant for a second time.19 Given the structure and purpose
of Section 512, judges have been – correctly, I would assert –
reluctant to force ISPs, including social network platforms, to
take over a greater part of the burden of enforcing copyright.
On the other hand, as already noted, if an ISP receives
repeated notices that the same user has posted infringing
material, it is obligated under the statute at some point to
terminate the subscriber.20 This provision is increasingly seen
as problematic. Obviously, ISPs are not anxious to cut off their
paying customers. But more importantly, because so much of
our communicatory lives now take place on the Internet,
disabling the ability of individuals to use e-mail, conduct
searches, and post or access content raises serious free speech
concerns. Anyone who has experienced a loss of Internet
service as a result of storm damage or technical difficulties
knows well how difficult both work and social communication
can be for the subscriber and for the people who expect to be
able to reach him or her at an e-mail address. The experience
in France offers an example that makes this point. The French
legislature passed a statute, called the HADOPI law, after the
entity created to administer it, that required ISPs to cut users
who infringed for the third time off of the Internet.21 The law
19. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y.
2013). On remand from the Second Circuit, the district court was asked to
determine, among other things, whether the evidence showed that YouTube
had knowledge of specific infringing materials, had “willfully blinded” itself to
specific infringements, or had a “right and ability to control” infringing
activity within the meaning of section 512. Id. The court concluded that
Viacom could not prove knowledge, and that failure to search for infringing
material based on a general awareness of its existence did not constitute
“willful blindness.” Id. at 115-17. As for the “right and ability to control,” the
court concluded that mere “knowledge of the prevalence of infringing activity,
and welcoming it, does not itself forfeit the safe harbor. To forfeit, the
provider must influence or participate in the infringement.” Id. at 118.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
21. HADOPI stands for the Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des
Oeuvres et la Protection des droits sur Internet. See Hadopi, HADOPI (2012),
http://www.hadopi.fr/en. For original title and text of law, see Lois 2009-1311
du 28 octobre 2009 relative à la protection pénale de la propriété littéraire et
artistique sur internet [Law 2009-1311 of October 28, 2009 Relating to Penal
Protection of Literary and Artistic Property on the Internet], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct.
29, 2009, at 183.
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cost millions to administer22 and reportedly resulted in one
court ordering one 15 day suspension of service.23 After a year
of this, the cut-off provision was repealed.24
II. More Statutes? More Treaties?
What to do?
The United States, which has been
particularly concerned about protecting its major content
providers, especially the music and motion picture industries,
tried two approaches: first, to pass more domestic statutes that
add even more stringent enforcement tools; second, to
champion trade agreements which, once ratified, would
mandate Congress to make the desired statutory changes (and
would bring other countries into closer conformity with U.S.
law).
Neither approach turned out to be easy. Congress first
tried to pass a statute that would have required ISPs to cut off
access to sites that harbored infringing content.25 After
22. Siraj Datoo, France Drops Controversial ‘Hadopi Law’ After
Spending
Millions,
GUARDIAN
(July
9,
2013,
11:09
EDT),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/09/france-hadopi-law-antipiracy. One source said that the actual figure was €12 million. See Hadopi
“Failure” a Warning for the UK?, 1709 BLOG (Aug. 8, 2012),
http://the1709blog.blogspot.com/2012/08/hadopi-failure-warning-for-uk.html.
See also Enigmax, Three Strikes Anti-Piracy Budget “Too Expensive to
Justify” Says Minister (Aug. 3, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/three-strikesanti-piracy-budget-too-expensive-to-justify-says-minister-120603/(attributing
that figure to The French Minister of Culture and Communication Aurélie
Filippetti). See generally Christophe Geiger, Challenges for the Enforcement
of Copyright in the Online World: Time for a New Approach (Max Planck Inst.
for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 14-01, 2014) forthcoming
EDWARD ELGAR, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (P. Torremans eds.) (2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2382603 (discussing the
graduated response approach and HADOPI in particular).
23. Datoo, supra note 22.
24. Publication of the Decree Removing the Additional Penalty of
Suspension of Access to the Internet, CULTURE COMMC’N (Sept. 7, 2013, 11:30),
http://translate.google.com.au/translate?sl=fr&tl=en&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UT
F&u=http://www.culturecommunication.gouv.fr/EspacePresse/Communiques/Publication-du-decret-supprimant-la-peinecomplementaire-de-la-suspension-d-acces-a-Internet.
25. The bills were entitled the Stop Online Piracy Act and Preventing
Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual
Property Act of 2011. H.R. 3621, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Stop Online
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massive protests by the public and by the Internet
community,26 Congress dropped the attempt to enact the Stop
Online Piracy Act or SOPA and its Senate analog, the Protect
IP Act or PIPA.27 There have also been efforts to export the
DMCA or substantially similar legislation (whatever its
drawbacks), and those have not fared well either. As already
noted, France’s three strikes notice-and-take-down scheme has
been scaled back decisively.28 The Trans-pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP),29 a secretly negotiated document that would
require its participants to adopt DMCA-like legislation, has
failed thus far to reach completion, partly because of resistance
by several countries to the intellectual property provisions,30
and a growing public outcry.31
A second, secretly negotiated, treaty that would require
expanded enforcement powers, including provisions similar to
those in the defeated SOPA and PIPA, has failed thus far to
gain traction as well.32
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade

Piracy Act]; S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
26. David A. Fahrenthold, SOPA Protests Shut Down Websites, WASH.
POST (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sopa-proteststo-shut-down-web-sites/2012/01/17/gIQA4WYl6P_story.html.
27. See Timothy B. Lee, Internet Wins: SOPA and PIPA Both Shelved,
ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 20, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2012/01/internet-wins-sopa-and-pipa-both-shelved/.
28. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. A recent study found
that HADOPI actually was not an effective deterrent to illegal downloading.
Michael A. Arnold et al., Graduated Response Policy and the Behavior of
Digital Pirates: Evidence from the French Three-Strike (Hadopi) Law, (Univ.
of DE, Alfred Lerner Coll. of Bus. & Econ., Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No.
2014-07, 2014).
29. The text of the intellectual property part of the draft was made
available by Wikileaks in November 2013. See TPP, supra note 6.
30. The line-up on various provisions of the draft is indicated in the copy
released by Wikileaks. Id.; see also Maira Sutton, Obama Nominates Former
SOPA Lobbyist to Help Lead TPP Negotiations, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar.
3, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/03/obama-nominates-formersopa-lobbyist-help-lead-tpp-negotiations (discussing the problems dogging the
treaty).
31. Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, 176 Million Workers Call to
Stop
TPP
Negotiations,
EYES
ON
TRADE
(Nov.
12,
2014),
http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/2014/11/176-million-workers-stop-theTPP.html.
32. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug.
5, 2013), https://www.eff.org/issues/acta (describing the negotiating process).
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Agreement, or ACTA,33 goes well beyond the TPP to require
enforcement measures that would provide “expeditious
remedies to prevent infringement and remedies which
constitute a deterrent to further infringement,”34 as well as
criminal sanctions for infringement on “a commercial scale.”35
Onerous civil damage provisions would also be required.36
Although what is meant by “expeditious remedies” has not
been spelled out, the provision has been widely interpreted as
an invitation to its signatories to require ISPs to engage in both
website blocking and deep packet filtering. And because
“commercial scale” is not defined, criminal sanctions could well
apply to informal peer-to-peer networks involving no profitmaking activity. Furthermore, the treaty calls for a committee
to be formed of members appointed from signatory countries to
oversee implementation of the treaty.37
ACTA stalled out when the European Parliament refused
to ratify it by a vote of 478 against to 39 in favor.38 Objections
included interference with data privacy and with freedom of
speech and communication.
As with SOPA and PIPA,
extensive public protests seem to have played a role in the
result.39
But content owners do not give up easily. If legislation and

33. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Oct. 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M.
243-57
[hereinafter
ACTA],
available
at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf.
34. Id. art. 27, ¶ 1.
35. Id. art. 23, ¶ 1.
36. A plaintiff is allowed to collect “the value of the infringed goods or
services measured by the market price, or the suggested retail price.” Id. art.
9, ¶ 1. A similar provision can be found in the draft of the TPP. See TPP,
supra note 6, at QQ.H.4(2ter); see also Lee, supra note 27.
37. ACTA, supra note 33, ch. V.
38. David Meyer, ACTA Rejected by Europe, Leaving Copyright Treaty
Near Dead, ZDNET (July 4, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/acta-rejected-byeurope-leaving-copyright-treaty-near-dead-7000000255/. The treaty could
nevertheless become effective in other signatory countries if ratified by six of
them. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE,
EXEC.
OFFICE
OF
THE
PRESIDENT,
http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
39. Eric Kirschbaum & Inna Ivanova, Protests Erupt Across Europe
Against
Web
Piracy
Treaty,
REUTERS
(Feb.
11,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/11/us-europe-protest-actaidUSTRE81A0I120120211.

9

2014

COPYRIGHT AND SOCIAL MEDIA

269

treaties are a tough sell, why not try to achieve the same ends
by means of private agreements? But why, you might ask,
would ISPs agree to take on responsibilities that the law seems
unwilling or unable to impose on them? One can only guess at
the reasons, but an obvious suspect is the prospect of costly
litigation – particularly when platforms like Facebook and
Twitter operate across borders and are subject to a variety of
potentially inconsistent national laws.40 And then there is that
oldie but goodie, the governmental “raised eyebrow.” By that, I
mean explicit official encouragement of private agreements,
backed by an implicit threat to enact more legislation if
“voluntary” efforts do not satisfy the content owners’ needs.
The proverbial eyebrow has been raised in the United
States by several members of Congress who lauded voluntary
agreements during hearings about the problem of piracy.41
Similar sentiments appear in a report by the Department of
Commerce’s Internet Policy Task Force.42 ACTA, too, expressly
40. For example, in 2012, a German court found YouTube liable for
infringing material posted by its users under circumstances that would likely
have not resulted in liability in the United States in light of its expansive
safe harbor provisions protecting hosting websites. Landgericht Hamburg
[LG Hamburg] [Hamburg Regional Court] Apr. 20, 2012 (Ger.). An English
translation
of
the
case
is
available
at
http://gmriccio.wordpress.com/2012/04/29/hamburg-district-court-gema-vyoutube-english-translation/. As of late 2014, the litigants still had not
reached a settlement on the royalties Google, which owns YouTube, now owes
to GEMA. Philip Stade. “This Video Is Not Available in Germany:” Online
Discourses on the German Collecting Society GEMA and YouTube, 19 FIRST
MONDAY
10
(2014),
available
at
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/5548/4127. GEMA has
sought review before the Arbitration Board of the German Patent and
Trademark Office. Id.
41. For example, Rep. Howard Coble, Chair of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet, is quoted as
saying: “[P]rivate sector actions are oftentimes more efficient and effective
than some regulations handed down by the federal government.” Tamlin H.
Bason, Copyrights/Hearings: House Subcommittee Examines Role of Industry
Agreements in Curbing Online Piracy, 86 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 2130 (2013).
42. A report states: “In the search for appropriate solutions, it is
important to note that legislation may not be the sole or the best avenue
available. Indeed, no single solution is likely to be enough; a combination of
approaches will be needed to create an environment that can sustain a
thriving market for legitimate content. Voluntary initiatives and best
practices, including those involving cooperation among right holders and
intermediaries, offer great promise and continue to be supported as an
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encourages the use of “cooperative efforts” within the business
community as a way to solve infringement problems.43 All of
this praise for private solutions is worth paying attention to
because, as it turns out, the voluntary solution approach is the
current poster child for digital copyright reform. Forget trying
to address the problem through carefully thought–out
legislation that attends to and attempts to balance the rights of
both owners and of the public; instead, encourage the content
industry and the ISPs to create a copyright enforcement system
that works for them – and hope the public interest does not get
lost in the process. The invitation has been accepted and new
extra-legal schemes have emerged quite rapidly.
Two major results of the turn toward private agreements
have been the Copyright Alert System and the Content ID
system.44 The Copyright Alert System is a so-called “graduated
response” protocol for dealing with infringements that take
place largely on peer-to-peer networks for which the ISP acts
as a pipeline rather than as a hosting entity.45 It calls for an
escalating series of warnings sent to the holders of the relevant
IP addresses, culminating by the sixth in some form of
“mitigation” measure to be determined, apparently, by the
ISP.46 Notably absent in the discussion of sanctions is any talk
of the unpopular remedy of cutting subscribers off of the
Internet.47
approach by the Administration.” INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY
41
(2013),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/copyrightgreenpape
r.pdf.
43. ACTA, supra note 33, art. 27, ¶ 3.
44. Other attempts have aimed at stopping pirate sites from sharing in
search engine advertising revenue, and provided for a Payment Processor
Program aimed at making it harder for purchasers to pay for counterfeit
items. See Stop Online Piracy Act, supra note 25, § 102(c)(2)(C) & (D).
45. What is a Copyright Alert?, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO. (2014),
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-system/what-is-acopyright-alert/ (the system is operated by the Center for Copyright
Information, an industry consortium).
46. Daniel Nazer, The Copyright Alert System FAQ, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 28, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/02/six-strikescopyright-alert-system-faq.
47. Resources and FAQ, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO. (2014),
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/resources-faq/copyright-alert-system-
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The agreement that has the most impressive teeth,
however, is the one that applies to social network platforms. A
substantial number of such platforms are now filtering the
content users’ attempts to post, looking for copyrighted work
and either keeping it from loading or flagging it in some way as
illicit.48 The best known example is YouTube’s Content ID
program, and thus it will serve as a model for the present
discussion. The Content ID approach can be thought of as the
privatized nuclear option.
How do Content ID and its siblings work? First, content
owners must assemble their content files and make, or have a
third party service create, a database of so-called digital
fingerprints from the originals. Whenever a user tries to
upload a file, an automated program looks to see if there are
matches between the database and the content the user is
trying to post.49 What happens next depends on the platform
and the wishes of the content owner.
If a match is found in a submission to YouTube, its
Content ID tool offers the owner three options. It can choose to
have the content blocked, and if the block is worldwide, that
fact will result in the user’s account not being in good standing.
This can bar the account holder from using certain standard
parts of the system such as YouTube Live or from uploading
certain kinds of videos.50 While it is clear that three copyright
strikes entered as a result of DMCA takedown notices can lead
to the termination of the user’s account,51 the effect of multiple
worldwide blocks, beyond what has already been mentioned, is
left unstated.
faqs/.
48. See How Do I Remove a Copyright Block?, MYSPACE,
https://help.myspace.com/hc/en-us/articles/202085854-Remove-A-CopyrightBlock (last visited Dec. 16, 2014) (Myspace uses what it calls a copyright
filter).
49. A Guide to YouTube Removals: So My Video Was Removed from
YouTube…What Do I Need to Know?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (2014),
https://www.eff.org/issues/intellectual-property/guide-to-youtube-removals.
50. Keep Your YouTube Account in Good Standing, YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797387?hl=en (last visited Dec.
16, 2014).
51. Copyright
Strike
Basics,
YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2814000?hl=en (last visited Dec.
16, 2014).
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Alternatively, the copyright claimant can allow the content
to be posted, and keep track of its viewership.52 Or, it can
allow the content to upload to the user’s account, and
“monetize” it. This means that any advertising revenue that
might be generated in conjunction with the content would be
split between Google and the copyright claimant rather than
between Google and the party posting it.53 Recognizing that
mistakes will occur with an automated system, Content ID
provides YouTube users with a dispute process that can get the
blocked material up on the user’s page.54 And in 2012, an
appeals process was added as well.55 If the copyright claimant,
upon being notified that the user is disputing the block,
continues to view the material as infringing, the user can
appeal. The “judicial body” that decides the appeal, however, is
hardly neutral: it is also the putative content owner. An
uploader who loses an appeal can expect to have the content
removed pursuant to a DMCA notice and takedown procedure,
which can (if several strikes are accrued) lead to suspension of
the user’s account.56
Furthermore, the uploader who
unsuccessfully appeals may also find him or herself subject to a
copyright infringement suit.57
In summary, instead of relying on the notice and takedown
system, the ex post remedy stipulated by the DMCA, YouTube
now allows content owners to engage in a priori control of what
can appear on the site. It is a practice that looks awfully much
like a prior restraint except that it escapes Constitutional
scrutiny because it is engaged in by private parties. Clearly,
52. How
Content
ID
Works,
YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Dec.
16, 2014).
53. Id. (users who post videos can join YouTube’s Partners Program,
which entitles them to share in ad revenue).
54. Dispute
a
Content
ID
Claim,
YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/content-id-disputes.html (last visited
Dec. 16, 2014).
55. Disputing
Copyright
Notifications,
FAIR
USE
TUBE.ORG,
http://fairusetube.org/guide-to-youtube-removals/4-disputing-copyrightnotifications (last visited Dec. 16, 2014).
56. Dispute
a
Content
ID
claim,
YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2770411?hl=enhttps://support.goo
gle.com/youtube/answer/2770411?hl=en (last visited Dec. 16, 2014).
57. Id.
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the process is advantageous to the content owner because
automated prescreening and blocking is less costly than
reliance on the DMCA. Content owners do not have to send out
thousands of DMCA notices and risk the possibility that a
court will find the form of the notice inadequate and hence
unenforceable.58 And they avoid the Whack-a-Mole problem;
prescreening means that repeated efforts to post putatively
infringing content on YouTube will simply fail.
Google, the owner of YouTube, likes Content ID because it
reduces the threat of suit by content owners59 and poses less of
a possibility that YouTube will face the need to cut off access to
valuable customers. Furthermore, its advertising revenue is
protected because, when an owner chooses to monetize
uploaded content rather than block it, a percentage of any
advertising income the poster was generating continues to flow,
unaffected, to YouTube. Finally, as YouTube becomes a
platform for more and more commercially produced content,
offering protection to content providers in the form of Content
ID is likely to increase the willingness of providers to use the
platform – clearly an added monetary benefit to YouTube.60
Admittedly, the system only works for owners who can
afford to participate in creating the necessary digital
fingerprints.
Furthermore, it lacks transparency and is
uninhibited by the notions of due process that a legally
imposed system would need to require: which is to say, you are
presumed guilty of infringement and your defenses are
adjudicated by your opponent. And, of course, because the
filtering is automatic, it is prone to significant errors. It
regularly identifies as infringing the content that does not
belong to the claimant. For one thing, content owners can be
58. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp.
2d 1099, 1109-10 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d sub. nom. UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011) (presenting a
list of artists rather than a list of works does not comply with the statute’s
notice provisions).
59. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.
2012) (suit seeking $1 billion in damages on the ground that YouTube’s
general awareness of the presence of infringing material on the site deprived
it of the protections of the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions).
60. Leslie Kaufman, Viacom and YouTube Settle Suit Over Copyright
Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2014, at B4 (stating that the terms of the
settlement were not revealed).
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remarkably generous to themselves in claiming ownership of
content, and for another, because algorithms are unable to
exercise judgment, infringement claims often involve materials
that are protected under the doctrine of fair use.61
This problem has long existed under the DMCA as well. In
a submission made several years ago in response to a new
provision of New Zealand copyright law62 and the draft Code of
Practice intended to implement it, Google cited a study of the
DMCA takedown notices it received. More than half were filed
against businesses by competitors and thirty-seven percent did
not state valid copyright claims.63 Google currently claims that
at least three percent of the notices it receives each week are
Many takedown notices involve clear
facially invalid.64
instances of fair use. Perhaps the most famous is the Lenz
case, where a video clip of a baby dancing to a copyrighted
recording became the subject of a widely-reported lawsuit.65
The trial court ultimately concluded that a copyright claimant
should not send a take-down notice without first conducting
some investigation into whether the use was fair so that when
the notice is sent, the complainant will be acting in good faith.66
One of the most prominent opponents of “excessive” copyright
protection, Larry Lessig, recently posted one of his lectures on
YouTube. Because it contained snippets of copyrighted music –

61. The fair use doctrine permits people to use copyrighted content
under certain circumstances without the permission of the owner. The
statute sets out a series of tests for determining whether or not an unlicensed
use is “fair.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
62. New Zealand Copyright Act 1994, § 92A (repealed Sept. 11, 2011),
available
at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1994/0143/latest/DLM3288800.html.
63. Carolyn Dalton & Antoine Aubert, Internet Service Provider
Copyright Code of Practice - TCF Consultation Draft, GOOGLE, 9 n.3 (March 6,
2009),
http://www.tcf.org.nz/content/ebc0a1f5-6c04-48e5-9215ef96d06898c0.cmr.
64. Parker Higgins & Kurt Opsahl, Top 10 Takedowns in Google’s
Copyright Transparency Report, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 5, 2012),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/top-10-takedowns-googles-copyrighttransparency-report (this figure does not take into consideration such
justified practices as fair use).
65. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9799 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013).
66. Id. at *6 (ultimately applying a subjective standard rather than
objective good faith).
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pretty clearly fair use – the Internet was abuzz when he was
subjected to a takedown notice.67
And, as the Google
submission shows, for some, the DMCA provides an
opportunity to exercise censorship over the speech of
competitors and critics. 68
It is not surprising, then, that similar problems would
occur with systems like Content ID. Examples abound. When
Michelle Obama addressed the Democratic National
Convention in 2012, a notice was posted at the end of the
YouTube feed of her speech that the feed was in violation of
copyright. Apparently, the automated filtering system read the
clip as using music illegally, even though the convention had
actually licensed the music and was in violation of no other
copyright.69
Another embarrassing example of automated overkill
occurred that same year. When the Mars Rover landed, NASA
fed the footage live to the public via YouTube, or shall we say it
tried to do so. Scripps News shut down the feed because the
material it used to check for infringing uploads contained
standard NASA footage that Scripps had included in its own
broadcasts. Hours passed before the feed could be restored.70
The problems with filtering have affected commercial
content producers as well.
Recently, the video maker,
67. Lawrence Lessig Settles Fair Use Lawsuit Over Phoenix Music
Snippets,
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Feb.
27,
2014),
https://www.eff.org/press/releases/lawrence-lessig-settles-fair-use-lawsuitover-phoenix-music-snippets (the settlement required the music company to
pay Lessig for the harm they caused him and to develop new policies that
take fair use into account).
68. Tamlin H. Bason, House IP Subcommittee Turns Attention to
DMCA’s Notice and Takedown Provisions, 87 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
J. (BNA) 1140 (2014) (the general counsel for a company that operates an
important blogging platform reports that the number of censorship-based
copyright notices his company receives has been rising steadily).
69. Will Oremus, Did YouTube Really Block Michelle Obama’s DNC
Speech for Copyright Infringement?, SLATE (Sept. 5, 2012, 2:37 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/09/05/michelle_obama_dnc_spe
ech_why_did_youtube_flag_it_for_copyright_infringement_.html.
70. Alex Pasternack, NASA’s Mars Rover Crashed Into a DMCA
Takedown,
MOTHERBOARD
(Aug.
6,
2012,
11:49
AM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/nasa-s-mars-rover-crashed-into-a-dmcatakedown (although the title suggests that the shutdown was a result of the
notice-and-takedown process, the article is clear that the interruption was a
result of a misapplication of Content ID).
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WatchMojo, had its YouTube channel shut down for 21 hours
when what it claims was a clear fair use was tagged as a
copyright violation.71 WatchMojo claimed that the interruption
was not only unwarranted but that it caused the company to
Ironically,
lose about $3,000 in advertising revenue.72
WatchMojo licenses its content to many of the same companies
involved in shutting it down and it also helps publicize those
producers’ content.73
More recently, the online gaming world has been up in
arms because Content ID has begun filtering game-related
material for possible infringement.74 Because this sort of
content may critique the design of computer games or help
players better understand the games, use of some copyrighted
content is almost inevitable. Those who produce this material
often earn a living from the advertising that accompanies their
posts, but a decision by a claimant to “monetize” supposedly
infringing content means that the poster’s share now goes to
the game producers.75 The creators of the game-related content
argue that what they do is just fair use, and furthermore is
generally welcomed by game designers.76 The frequency with
which claimants monetize rather than block this content
suggests that some truth exists in the claim that these
derivative works are valuable to the games’ designers.
The examples I have used thus far come from YouTube,
but other social networks, such as MySpace also engage in
similar kinds of filtering.77 Although some believe that only
well-heeled, high-volume sites can afford a version of Content
71. Joshua Cohen, Top 50 YouTube Channel Terminated, Casualty of
Content
ID,
TUBEFILTER
(Dec.
15,
2013),
http://www.tubefilter.com/2013/12/15/youtube-channel-terminated-copyrightcontent-id/.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Paul Tassi, The Injustice of the YouTube Content ID Crackdown
Reveals Google’s Dark Side, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2013/12/19/the-injustice-of-theyoutube-content-id-crackdown-reveals-googles-dark-side/.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Nicholas Deleon, Myspace to Implement Copyrighted Video Filtering,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 12, 2007), http://techcrunch.com/2007/02/12/myspace-toimplement-copyrighted-video-filtering/.
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ID, at least some smaller sites are actually adopting it as well,
and with it, the same set of problems. Ustream, a video site,
was showing the Hugo Awards for science fiction in 2012 when
the feed was halted in midstream.78 The apparent problem?
Neal Gaiman was receiving an award for the script he wrote for
a television show. Prior to giving him the award, some clips
from the show were shown. The automated filter registered
them as infringing – despite the fact that the studio itself had
supplied the clips to the Hugo Award organizers.79
What is the proper response to all of this? Clearly an
awful lot of infringing activity takes place on the Internet, and
content providers claim that the losses they incur are serious
enough to act as a disincentive to the creation of new works.
From that point of view, one might say, “Okay, the prescreening process is not perfect but it is the cheapest, most
efficient way to solve a serious economic problem.” But I would
argue that answer is simply wrong.
Filtering does serve the interests of major players in the
copyright industries,80 but it does so by running roughshod over
the rights and interests of other participants in the social
networks involved. In addition to any implications it may have
for personal privacy, filtering poses serious challenges to free
speech and to one of copyright’s central speech protections, fair
use.81 Frequent statements are made about the need, in
78. Zachary Knight, Copyright Enforcement Bots Seek and Destroy Hugo
Awards,
TECHDIRT
(Sept.
4,
2012,
5:11
AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120903/18505820259/copyrightenforcement-bots-seek-destroy-hugo-awards.shtml.
79. Id.
80. The system largely serves major content providers because
participation is cost effective for them. It is more difficult for small players,
especially ones like photographers with numerous works to their credit, to be
able to afford to have the necessary digital fingerprints made of their work
that would enable them to participate in programs like Content ID.
81. For useful critiques of mandatory filtering, see Lilian Edwards, Role
and Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright and
Related
Rights,
WIPO
(June
22,
2011),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/role_and_responsibilit
y_of_the_internet_intermediaries_final.pdf; Mehan Jayasuriya et al., Forcing
the Net Through a Sieve: Why Copyright Filtering is Not a Viable Solution for
U.S.
ISPs,
PUB.
KNOWLEDGE
(July
13,
2009),
http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-filtering-whitepaper-200907.pdf;
Network Filtering: Limiting Cultural Industries, Damaging the Internet,
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searching for solutions to infringement, also to honor copyright
norms.82 But automated filtering would simply be incapable of
maintaining copyright law’s carefully-calibrated balance
between users’ and owners’ rights. (And no one, I would bet, is
interested in making the investment that would be necessary
to have humans check on the validity of an automated match.)
That routine, mandatory filtering is fatally-flawed was
certainly the conclusion of the European Parliament when it
rejected ACTA.83 During consideration of the treaty, note was
made of the fact that, earlier in the same year, the European
Union Court of Justice in two cases, Sabam v. Netlog (a social
network case)84 and Scarlet v. Sabam (a peer-to-peer file
sharing case),85 ruled that requiring across-the-board
preventative filtering by ISPs neither offered sufficient
protection to personal privacy86 nor struck a fair balance
between the interests of copyright owners and users. The court
was concerned that the costs imposed by a filtering
requirement for all ISPs could interfere with provision of
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(2007),
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/effeurope/NetworkFiltering.pdf.
82. For example, the draft of the TPP chapter on intellectual property
states in its Objectives, Art. QQ.A.1, that one objective of the treaty is to
“maintain a balance between the rights of intellectual property holders and
the legitimate interests of users and the community in subject matter
protected by intellectual property.” TPP, supra note 6. See also 17 U.S.C. §
1201(c)(1) (2012) (“nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under
this title”).
83. The European Parliament was also deeply concerned over the
application of criminal sanctions for commercial activity, a term that was so
loosely defined that it could well be understood to reach an individual who
downloaded a song, rather than buying it. Geiger, supra note 22, at 12-13.
84. Case C-360/10, Sabam v. Netlog NV (Feb. 16, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119512&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=387762.
85. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Sabam (Nov. 24, 2011),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=115202&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=387828.
86. Clearly, Europe is more concerned than is the United States with
data privacy and the likelihood that data posted on Internet sites by
individuals would be routinely harvested played a large role in its refusal to
ratify. One cannot say the same on this side of the pond. Humorously, the
major Internet players have expressed horror at the spying done by the
National Security Agency (NSA) on Internet communications, while moving
in the same direction themselves in the interests of copyright.
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Internet services. But, it also emphasized that the risk of
misidentifying material as infringing would interfere
impermissibly with the public’s right to receive and impart
information.87 The problem posed by automated filtering is
particularly problematic for Europe because, unlike America,
several nations have built in considerable latitude for private,
noncommercial copying into their copyright laws.88
A common response in the United States to the claim that
filtering is harmful to freedom of speech (and indeed to the
creation of potentially valuable new works) is to say, “The
number of mistakes is so small that we don’t need to worry
about them.” In other words, the fuss outstrips reality. As an
empirical matter, how many mistakes are made and how
“significant” they are is hard to evaluate with any exactitude.89
87. However, in UPC Telekabel Wein GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih
GmbH, the court modified, or refined if one prefers, its earlier holdings. C314/12, UPC Telekabel Wein GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH,
(March,
27,
2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=149924&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=478368.
The case involved access through an ISP to a site where pirated movies were
available. The decision agreed that an injunction can be issued requiring an
ISP to take “all reasonable measures” — which might include filtering — to
interfere with subscribers’ access to a website that provides illegal content
although filtering may not specifically be ordered. Id. ¶ 66(2). The court
emphasized that any measure adopted “must be strictly targeted” to avoid
interfering with access to legal content, Id. ¶ 56, and that the reasonableness
of the ISP’s response is to be measured in relation to the resources available
to it and to its other “obligations and challenges.” Id. ¶ 52.
88. See Edwards, supra note 81, at 62.
89. The National Research Council, in a recent report, noted that it is
difficult to assess the losses caused by Internet copying because the
information about loss comes from stakeholders rather than from the
systematic analysis of hard data. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COPYRIGHT
IN THE DIGITAL ERA: BUILDING EVIDENCE FOR POLICY 1-2 (Stephen A. Miller &
William
J,
Raduchel
eds.
2013),
available
at
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/copyrightpolicy/. Google, which
gets vast numbers of DMCA takedown notices each week, estimates that
about three percent are unambiguously erroneous or intentionally wrong.
Considering the number of such notices it receives, in absolute terms, this is
an enormous amount. And it does not take into account things like fair use.
See Parker Higgins & Kurt Opsahl supra note 64 and figures cited in
accompanying text. According to one news report, the makers of the movie
Dallas Buyers Club asked Google to take down some 388 URLs on its search
engine. Among the supposedly infringing sites to which Google was not to
link was a page on a video-on-demand service where the movie was legally
available. The takedown notice was considered sufficiently inaccurate so that
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But, I would argue that a system that suppresses even
comparatively small amounts of protected speech is worth
worrying about, particularly in light of the fact that avoiding
such suppression is a major objective of copyright.90 One might
also be forgiven for asking whether the costs – to free
communications and creativity as well as to the Internet
businesses themselves – really bear any rational
proportionality to the harm from Internet infringement to the
copyright industries. More on that subject in a moment.
But first, a few conclusions. I fear that what we are
witnessing is the result of an abdication by governmental and
legislative bodies – in particular in the United States – of a
core responsibility to maintain a well-balanced copyright
system. When private parties are actively encouraged to find
their own private solutions to problems, particularly when
those solutions are ones that have proven too politically toxic to
be enacted into positive law, government is in the position of
giving the copyright industries a green light to steer right past
(or right through) such tricky issues as fair use, freedom of
speech and due process. This state of affairs should give one
pause.
In effect, the tilt toward private ordering turns
copyright law into window dressing, capable of being evaded,
along with all of its constitutionally-mandated protections,91
simply by agreeing to do so. This is not a beneficial, and
certainly not a beneficent, solution.
Of course, private agreements are sometimes capable of
improving on the law by smoothing out some unnecessary
complexities and making the statutory intent easier and
cheaper to achieve – the licensing practices of collective rights
Google declined to take down any of the listed sites. Ernesto, “Dallas Buyers
Club” Makers Censor Comcast on Demand, by Mistake, TORRENTFREAK, (Mar.
2, 2014), https://torrentfreak.com/movie-studio-wants-dallas-buyers-club140302/.
90. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to
Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 313-15 (2004).
91. It is widely agreed that both the fair use doctrine and the rule that
limits copyright only to expression and not to facts or ideas are necessary
protections that keep copyright from running afoul of the first amendment.
See Robert Kasunic, Symposium, Constitutional Challenges to Copyright:
Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 397,
397 (2007).
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societies for music provide some examples of this.92 But if
there are no clear limits to what can be resolved privately, and
if parties are invited to go places that seem to contravene basic
standards of traditional copyright, what can result is a power
grab in the name of copyright by commercial actors for their
own benefit, with little or no thought to the costs arbitrarily
imposed on the rest of us.
Perhaps one might justify abdicating intellectual property
policy-making to private parties (although I doubt it) if the
harm to be avoided were sufficiently grievous and adequate
legal remedies were inadequate. Certainly, copyright owners
and the negotiators of trade agreements assume that the harm
is serious and the need for draconian remedies is obvious.
Indeed, the application of statutory damages provisions to
individual noncommercial copyists in the United States seems
to reinforce that assumption.93
That claim, however, is contestable. Let us start with
what seems to be a common sense assumption: that every
instance of unconsented copying represents a sale lost to the
copyright owner. This may seem logical at first glance but, as
it turns out, the reality of the matter is considerably more
complex.
For example, although courts have shown no
willingness to accept the argument that music downloading on
peer-to-peer networks can be a fair use because it is often done
to “sample” music,94 a recent study in Canada found that
downloading music from peer-to-peer networks actually was

92. For example, the Harry Fox Agency, which handles the compulsory
license royalties for song makers when their music is recorded, allows the
accounting for royalties to be made quarterly, instead of monthly. See 17
U.S.C. § 115(5); see also ROBERT A. GORMAN, JANE C. GINSBURG & R. ANTHONY
REESE, COPYRIGHT CASES AND MATERIALS 641 (8th ed. 2011).
93. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2431 (2012) (reinstating trial verdict of $675,000
in statutory damages against individual who uploaded thirty copyrighted
songs to share over a peer-to-peer network, but ordering the lower court to
consider remittitur). On remand, the district court judge concluded that no
ground existed for remittitur and allowed the original damage award to
stand. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, No. CV-07-11446-(RWZ),
2012 WL 3639053 (D. Mass. Aug 23, 2012), aff’d, 719 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2013).
94. See, e.g., BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889-90 (7th Cir.
2005) (downloading to sample not fair use).
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positively correlated with increased purchases of music.95 This
finding has been echoed by several other commentators.96
But, a significant amount of the copyrighted material that
is traded or otherwise used online for free causes owners no
loss at all for other reasons. If enforcement is directed toward
these users, the likely result would be only marginal gains for
copyright owners because, given a choice between paying or not
using the work, the users would opt for the latter. Purchase of
a copy or a license simply would not be worth it to them.97 I
strongly believe that this is one reason why it has been so
difficult to pin down the extent of economic harm from
technologies ranging from photocopying to peer-to-peer sharing
of music files: our appetite for free fare is a lot bigger than our
appetite for the metered kind.98 If we can get it for nothing, we
will take it, even if we never look at or listen to it again. There
is no doubt that it is worthwhile and fair to provide realistic
enforcement tools to go after profit-making, large-scale
copyists, but that doesn’t describe most of the posters whose
work currently runs afoul of technologies like Content ID.
Where do I come out on this? Should the burden go back to
legislators to solve the infringement problem, or at least to put
limits on the kinds of agreements private actors can
legitimately enforce? I believe the answer is yes. Copyright is
too important to the public to allow interested parties to control
the way the system works. One might think it wholly
uncontroversial that Congress, rather than social networks and
commercial content producers, should set — with open and fair
95. For every download, the authors found that compact disk purchases
increased by 0.44%. BIRGITTE ANDERSEN & MARION FRENZ, THE IMPACT OF
MUSIC DOWNLOADS AND P-TO-P FILE-SHARING ON THE PURCHASE OF MUSIC: A
STUDY
FOR
INDUSTRY
CANADA,
33
(2007),
available
at
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ippddppi.nsf/vwapj/IndustryCanadaPaperMay4_2007_en.pdf/$FILE/IndustryCan
adaPaperMay4_2007_en.pdf.
96. See id. at 8-9 for references to other studies making a similar point.
97. See John M. Newman, Copyright Freenomics, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1409,
1446 (2013) (Newman argues that at $0.00 price point, people will typically
“overconsume,” that is, they will hoard copies they never or rarely use); see
also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Modern Technology, Leaky Copyrights, and
Claims of Harm: Insights from the Curious History of Photocopying, 61 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 55-56 (2013).
98. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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input from all interested parties — the terms that govern what
is permissible on hosted sites. Since the least controversial
arena for action is regulation of commercial infringers, it
should be possible to define the term “commercial”
infringement in relation to the Internet carefully and then offer
remedies, complete with checks and balances, to deal with it.
But the case has yet to be made that every website that has
some infringing content, and every individual who utilizes that
content for personal, artistic, and social reasons, should be
swept into the same net.
To the extent that small-scale, random individual uses do
pose an economic problem for copyright owners, truth-to-tell it
may just be one that cannot be resolved with remedies that are
cost-effective, proportionate to the damage caused, and fairly
administered. A system that presumes guilt and does not
provide neutral arbiters in the case of disputes certainly does
not seem to meet the test of fairness. If we are really serious
about protecting fair use and free speech, some form of due
process ought to be the least we require. Of course, that means
that funds would have to be devoted to creating mechanisms to
protect the users’ interests adequately, and that is likely to be
too expensive for private and public actors.
Given the
uncertainties about the seriousness of the harm, a system to
combat it that costs more than the losses it is meant to prevent
is hardly better than simply ignoring the infringement. Even
the maligned DMCA notice-and-takedown process might seem
more reasonable in comparison.99
Personally, I strongly suspect that the problem of
noncommercial infringement on the Internet will simply prove
too costly to solve by law and implicates interests too serious to
be “solved” by universal automated pre-screening of hosting
ISPs like YouTube. What is called for is some serious
creativity. Perhaps, for example, some sort of surcharge on
Internet connections, to be distributed based on an agreedupon system of sampling, would offer a fair solution to the
issue of nonprofit uses. Surcharges are commonly used to
compensate for private copying in European copyright

99. This is unlikely, however, since a system providing something
resembling due process would be very expensive. See supra note 22.
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systems,100 and have been experimented with in the United
States as well.101
The main challenge of the Internet, however, is less to
copyright as such (and to the authors it aims to protect) than to
traditional business models for marketing content. Broadcast
television and record album sales are at risk because the
Internet allows consumers and downstream creators (who want
to repurpose existing materials) to consume and use these
kinds of content in new, more congenial ways. Because so
much material is already out there, and out there for free (the
reasons for this are a subject for another article),
intermediaries in the business of distributing content cannot
dream of recreating the pre-Internet world; they urgently need
to learn to compete with free, either by finding other ways to
monetize their content – advertising, for example – or by
offering perks and services that make it worthwhile for users to
buy the content because it is better than “free.” This is not piein-the-sky: if it were, iTunes and Netflix would not have
become the successes they are today. And Spotify, which
100. See MARTIN KRETSCHMER, PRIVATE COPYING AND FAIR
COMPENSATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT LEVIES IN EUROPE, A
REPORT FOR THE UK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (2011), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ip_econ_ge_1_12/wipo_ip_eco
n_ge_1_12_ref_kretschmer; see also Jőrg Reinbothe, The Private Copying,
Levies and DRMs Against the Background of the EU Copyright Framework,
ASSOC. OF EUROPEAN PERFORMANCE ORG. (2003),
http://www.artisaepo.org/usr/docs%20drms/speech%20Reinbothe-private%20copyinglevies%20and%20DRM.pdf. A recent ruling by the European Court of
Justice, however, throws doubt on whether, at least in Europe, copyright
levies can be used to compensate intellectual property owners for materials
copied from illicit sites. Case C-435/12, ACI Adam BV v. Stichting de
Thuiskopie
(Apr.
10,
2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=150786&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=491416. An
explanation of the import of the case is also available. Press Release No.
58/14, Court of Justice of the European Union, The Amount of the Levy
Payable for Making Private Copies of a Protected Work May Not Take
Unlawful Reproductions into Account (Apr. 10, 2014),
available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/201404/cp140058en.pdf.
101. Chapter 10 of the Copyright Act of 1976 allows consumers to make
copies of music for noncommercial purposes using a digital or analog tape
recorder without liability. 17 U.S.C. §1008 (2012). But, royalties were
attached instead to the sale of digital audio recording devices and the media
used by them to make recordings. Id. § 1004.
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allows unlimited free access to music for people who agree to
receiving ads with the content, could not exist.102 The success
of sites that depend on voluntary payments from users show
that the public has an interest it is willing to act on in making
sure artists can afford to continue to create.103
This future can come none too soon. We have seen the
present, and it is not pretty.

102. See Spotify Features Page, SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/#allmusic (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). The website offers two options, a free one
with advertisements and a premium one without advertisements for a fee.
Lilian Edwards’ report to WIPO similarly points out not merely the need for
new business models, but the success of several that have been tried.
Edwards, supra note 81, at 67-70.
103. See Yochai Benkler, Voluntary Payment Models, in RETHINKING
MUSIC: A BRIEFING BOOK 27 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet and Soc’y at Harv.
Univ.,
2011),
available
at
https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Rethinking_M
usic_Voluntary_Payment_Models.pdf; Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 1390-93.
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